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QUALIFIED INTIMACY, CELEBRITY, AND THE CASE
FOR A NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE
Rodney A Smolla*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this symposium issue Robert Nagel, Diane Zimmerman,
Robert O'Neil, and Erwin Chemerinsky explore the intersection of
privacy and freedom of the press. In his fascinating inquiry into
privacy and celebrity in modern American life, Robert Nagel
demonstrates the connection between the American public's strong
commitment to privacy and its simultaneous passion for robust
protection of freedom of speech.1 Among his most important
insights is the exposure of "pseudo-intimacy" as a principal currency
of contemporary celebrity status. Diane Zimmerman,2 Robert
O'Neil,3 and Erwin Chemerinsky4 all investigate the legal principles
that ought to surround aggressive and surreptitious newsgathering
techniques, each in their own way drawing the conclusion that some
legal protection ought to extend to at least some exercises in
surreptitious newsgathering. Spurred by these efforts, my aim here
is to look for links among the themes in this scholarship, and to offer
some comment of my own on the cultural and legal issues presented.
II. CELEBRITY, PSEUDO-INTIMACY, AND PSEUDO-NEWS
Starting at the broadest level with Robert Nagel's intriguing
exposure of pseudo-intimacy as the hallmark of modern celebrity, I
am struck by how the qualities of modern celebrity described by
Robert Nagel coincide so perfectly with accepted legal doctrines
regarding the levels of constitutional protection media reportage on
* George Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See Robert F. Nagel, Privacy and Celebrity: An Essay on the Nationalization of
Intimacy, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1121 (2000).
2. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1185 (2000).
3. Robert M. ONeil, Ride-alongs, Paparazzi, and Other Media Threats to Privacy, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1167 (2000).
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, ProtectthePress:AFirstAmendmentStandardforSafeguarding
Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1143 (2000).
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the lives of celebrities should receive. I doubt the coincidence is
coincidental. I also doubt that it is sound.
Speaking not in legal terms-of-art, but in simple colloquial
cultural descriptions, we might very plausibly divide the world into
noncelebrities, minor celebrities, and major celebrities. Such a
cultural description would conveniently track current First Amend-
ment doctrine, at least as it has been articulated in defamation law.
The First Amendment doctrines governing defamation created in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5 divide the world of potential plaintiffs
into three principal categories: private figures, limited-purpose
public figures, and all-purpose public figures.6 A person in any of
these three categories might find himself the subject of news
coverage that he deems libelous, an invasion of his privacy, or the
product of illegal or tortious newsgathering methods. At least for
the purposes of defamation, Gertz instructs that three different legal
standards will apply to our private figures (the noncelebrities), our
limited-purpose public figures (the minor celebrities), and our all-
purpose public figures (the major celebrities). Private-figure
defamation plaintiffs must normally establish only negligence by the
defendant to recover for libel.7 Limited-purpose public figures and
all-purpose public figures must establish "actual malice," defined as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.'
The difference between the "limited-purpose" and "all-purpose"
public figure is in the "relevancy" or "germaneness" concept. The
limited-purpose public figure is usually understood as a person who
enters a particular public controversy.9 The plaintiff is deemed a
public figure only for stories germane to that controversy. Some-
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. In its historic ruling in Gertz, the Supreme Court held that in defamation actions
brought by private figures in which the defamatory speech involves issues of public concern,
states are free to predicate liability on a showing of ordinary negligence. See id. at 347.
Unlike public officials and public figures who may recover for defamation only after
demonstrating that the defendant published the defamatory statement with "actual malice,"
defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity, see New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), mere negligence will support a verdict in favor
of private-figure plaintiffs. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
7. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
8. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
9. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. In Gertz, the Court explained:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.
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times courts further tighten the requirements, emphasizing the
extent to which the person's entry into the controversy was "volun-
tary" and the extent to which the entry was made to "influence" the
outcome of the controversy.1 ° The link between limited-purpose
public figure status and the notion of "public controversy" might also
be thought of as a link between the decision to provide higher levels
of First Amendment protection for speech germane to "public
controversies" and the idea of protecting "public discourse."" The
limited-purpose public figure category in Gertz seemed quite directly
linked to conceptions of the First Amendment that are relatively
high-minded, conjuring up images of public debate and deliberation
on "controversial" subjects in which parties are attempting to
influence outcomes.
10. In Wolston v. Reader's DigestAss'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff, Wolston, who was brought before a grand jury investigation in connection with
an espionage inquiry, was a private figure. See id. at 162-64. Wolston ignored a subpoena
requiring him to appear before a grand jury in 1958, and subsequently pleaded guilty to a
charge of criminal contempt. See id. at 162-63. Wolston's episode with the grand jury
investigation and his subsequent conviction for criminal contempt resulted in 15 newspaper
articles in New York and Washington, D.C. See id. at 163. Emphasizing that Wolston had
not invited controversy by entering into the public arena to influence public debate, the
Supreme Court held Wolston to be a private figure. See id. at 167-68.
11. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that Mary
Alice Firestone, wife of Russell Firestone and a member of the wealthy Firestone family, was
a private figure, despite being embroiled in bitter and highly publicized divorce litigation. See
id. at 453-57. She had done nothing to invite public controversy other than to participate in
the litigation, the Court reasoned, and this was not enough to bring her vithin the definition
of a public figure. See id. at 454-55 n.3. Firestone's prominence in what the Court depicted
as "the sporting set" did not qualify her as a person of "especial prominence in the affairs of
society." Id. at 453. Even though Mrs. Firestone initiated litigation in a public court of law,
the Court held that her action was not a purposeful insertion into a matter of public
controversy, since state law compelled her to resort to legal process in order to obtain lawful
release from the bonds ofmatrimony. See id. at 454. Although the Court conceded that some
participants in some litigation may be legitimate public figures, either generally or for the
limited purpose of press coverage concerning the litigation, the majority would regard Mary
Alice Firestone as "drawn into a public forum largely against [her] will in order to attempt
to obtain the only redress available to [her] or to defend [herself] against actions brought by
the State or by others." Id. at 457. See also Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-
37 (2d Cir.. 1984) (adopting a four-part test for determining limited-purpose public figure
status, requiring defendant to prove plaintiff- (1) successfully invited public attention to his
views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2)
voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation;
(3) assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular
and continuing access to the media); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668
(4th Cir. 1982) (adopting a five-part test for determining limited-purpose public figure status,
requiring defendant to prove: (1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effective
communication; (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public
controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy;
(4) the controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statements; and (5) the
plaintiff retained public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation).
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But the all-purpose public figure category seems quite different.
It is not grounded in any nexus to public controversy, or any
conception of public discourse. The all-purpose public figure is the
major celebrity, the cultural superstar, a person distinguished more
by raw power and influence than by contribution to the marketplace
of ideas. 12 And herein lies the first ironic twist: The very highest
levels of First Amendment protection are awarded to that most
unlikely and seemingly unworthy of recipients, the tabloid.
The all-purpose public figure category in Gertz is, in one sense, the
"tabloid public figure" category. This can be put in cultural or legal
terms; either way the essential notion is the same. Culturally, it is
when a celebrity makes the tabloids that true stardom has arrived.
If you're not in the tabloids, you haven't quite fully made it as a
celebrity, or at least as a mega-celebrity, a phenomenon, a cultural
force. It's when the tabloids start writing about you that you know
you've hit the big time in this culture. This is expressed in legal
doctrine in Gertz and its all-purpose public figure doctrine precisely
in the message that for the all-purpose public figure, every aspect of
life is deemed a matter of public concern. 3 No nexus between the
subject of a story and the public figure's entry into a public contro-
versy is required-indeed the notion of "public controversy" that is
central to the limited-purpose public figure concept in Gertz
completely drops out of the calculation when we are dealing with the
all-purpose public figure. No concept of "relevancy" or "germane-
ness" exists for the all-purpose public figure because everything
about the all-purpose public figure is relevant and germane. 4
The all-purpose public figure concept in Gertz is thus entirely
divorced from any serious notion of "public discourse." So are most
tabloids. 5
This invites such questions as why this seems to be so and
whether it should be so. We might start with the simple cultural
question of why it is that appearance in tabloids largely defines a
person's ascendance to mega-celebrity (or all-purpose public figure)
status. The mega-celebrity will, to be sure, still appear in non-
tabloid publications. Michael Jordan, Madonna, Tom Cruise, and
12. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 ("For the most part those who attain this status have
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.").
13. See id. at 344-45.
14. See id.
15. See Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment for the
Rest of Us?, 9 DEPAuL J. ART & ENT. 1, 4-6 (1998).
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Bill Clinton are all mega-celebrities who appear in mainstream non-
tabloid media daily. (I mean to include a broad spectrum of non-
tabloid culture, from the New York Times or CNN to Sports
Illustrated or Esquire.) But I am suggesting that it is the fact that
they also appear daily in tabloid culture (the National Enquirer on
the print side or Hard Copy on the broadcast side) that essentially
marks them as mega-celebrities.
Now why is this true? Robert Nagel's discussion of the relation-
ship between privacy and celebrity provides some revealing clues.
Mega-celebrity is a form of false intimacy. 6 The mega-celebrity
creates the appearance of genuine connection with the mass public,
but the events that generate the sense of connection are pseudo-
events and the connection itself lacks authenticity."
Celebrities who affirmatively desire to maintain or enhance their
celebrity status naturally want to encourage this form of false
intimacy. It's called publicity. Fame and fortune are linked to it.
To be sure many celebrities purport to despise tabloid journalism
because tabloids distort the truth about their lives and invade their
privacy. Most celebrities who say they despise tabloids are probably
sincere. They at least think they despise tabloids. What they may
not entirely perceive, however, is how closely their status as
celebrities is linked to what the tabloids do.
If part of what defines celebrity status in modern life is a "larger-
than-life" sense of intimacy and connection that celebrities are able
to achieve with the mass public, tabloids are an important medium
for the creation of that perceived intimacy. Celebrities and tabloids
have a symbiotic relationship. Celebrities need tabloids to fully
realize their celebrity status. Tabloids need celebrities to have
something to write about. Without celebrities, tabloids would not be
viable.
The argument that celebrities need tabloids to "fully realize" their
celebrity status is not without its caveats and complications. The
"realization" being talked about here is arguably hollow, crass, and
unbefitting. It is, as I have already ventured, largely divorced from
any central notion of public discourse. Perhaps more profoundly,
however, it seems divorced from genuine achievement, merit, effort,
or spirituality.
16. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 1131.
17. See id.
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If tabloids undoubtedly need celebrities, the reverse is not so
obviously true. Celebrities would exist without tabloids, and
perhaps be happier for their absence. Celebrities who are sports
figures, entertainers, artists, politicians, or religious leaders would
still be doing their work, after all, and find such respectable news
outlets as the New York Times or CNN reporting on them daily,
without the unwelcome addition of salacious tabloid reporting.
Michael Jordan's slashing drives to the basket, Madonna's voice,
Tom Cruise's acting, and Bill Clinton's political savvy would all be
the same if tabloids did not exist. What really ought to give cultural
meaning to their lives, one would think, are their talents and
performances. Celebrities don't need tabloids to display their
talents and performances, and the public doesn't need tabloids to
appreciate them.
If this is true, then one of the defining aspects of modern celebrity,
the craving for false intimacy, is exposed as highly pathological and
dysfunctional, an addictive drug not good for either the celebrity or
the mass public.
At this point, the all-purpose public figure status begins to look
like a highly dubious doctrine. If the national desire to protect
privacy and the national commitment to robust protection of
freedom of speech both spring from a common devotion to liberty,
that devotion appears only perversely served by the all-purpose
public figure status. To bless with high levels of First Amendment
protection stories about public figures that are salacious and seamy
but not in any plausible way connected to the public figure's public
role is to bestow heavy levels of protection for speech that provides
only the most trivial payoff for public discourse. 8 If the perceived
payoff is the illumination of the "non-discourse" side of life, such as
the exploration of human nature through exposure of sexual foibles,
enhancing our collective intimacy and interconnection, that intimacy
and connection appear on closer review to be largely ersatz.
This discussion seems to lead to serious consideration of abandon-
ing the all-purpose public figure status, and leaving tabloids out in
the cold for much of the content they produce. Yet, as might be
expected, this course also has many pitfalls.
18. I am again speaking nontechnically here, to include within the notion of "public role"
such roles as playing professional basketball or acting in a movie as much as serving as the
President of the United States.
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There is, first, the general blurring in modern culture of the
distinction between tabloid and mainstream journalism.' One of
the hallmarks ofmega-celebrity status is that, even when the mega-
celebrity appears in the mainstream non-tabloid media, the subject
matter of the story will sometimes be tabloid in nature. That is to
say, it will appear to focus heavily on aspects of the mega-celebrity's
life not obviously germane to any public controversy. 20
Take the recurring question of sexual impropriety by political
leaders, such as stories about alleged illicit liaisons that plagued the
political careers of Gary Hart, Senator Charles Robb, and Bill
Clinton. In all three of these examples, the sexual liaisons alone did
not appear to bear much direct connection to fitness for or perfor-
mance in office. In all three cases the alleged sexual activity was,
eventually, widely reported in mainstream media. And in all three
cases, the mainstream media was heavily criticized in many
quarters for having abandoned appropriate journalistic standards.
When an NBC story reported Senator Robb's alleged assignation
with a beauty queen, for example, NBC initially came under more
criticism than Senator Robb.2 '
The rap on the media in such cases is that the respectable press
has "gone tabloid" and thus broken a taboo: the requirement of
relevancy. If these sexual escapades are not genuinely newsworthy,
the media outlets presenting them are no longer genuinely news
organizations. Like tabloids, they are presenting pseudo-news,
feeding the public's dysfunctional craving for pseudo-intimacy.2
2
Once the taboo is shattered, intense debate follows over whether
the relevancy requirement has or has not been satisfied by some
connection between the report on sex and some other independently
newsworthy aspect of the story. One of the remarkable aspects of
the Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky story, for example, was the
apparently overwhelming consensus that the sexual behavior of the
two would truly have not been anybody else's business if it had stood
alone. Most public discussion centered not on whether sexual
impropriety alone would have merited public exposure and official
censure (since the consensus on this point was that it would not),
but rather whether in Clinton's case the sexual impropriety did or
did not stand alone. Thus the argument turned on whether this was
19. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 6-10.
20. See id. at 7-9.
21. See Howard Kurtz, The Robb Story Snowball: NBCReportPushes Senatoronto Front
Page, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1991, at C1.
22. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 8-10.
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about more than sex,. Those who claimed that the story was
newsworthy and that the President deserved to be punished
grounded their arguments in such alleged offenses as perjury or
obstruction of justice.
Clinton's case, in my view, thus may have represented a modest
shift in the center of gravity of public debate over the relevancy
question. In Gary Hart's case, there was no real claim of perjury or
obstruction ofjustice. He was exposed for cheating on his wife, pure
and simple. The argument was that this exposure was newsworthy
because he was "reckless," because he had a habit of using women
for meaningless affairs, because he had issued his infamous "go
ahead and tail me" challenge, and most amorphously of all, because
it exposed a weakness in his character. A person who will lie to his
or her spouse may well lie to the nation. A person who will not
abide his or her wedding vows may not abide the constitutional
oath.2
3
It was interesting that while all of these arguments did surface in
Clinton's case, they were far more muted. Kenneth Starr did not
attempt to justify his investigation of the President on such "charac-
ter" grounds, nor did many members of the House of Representa-
tives who voted for impeachment, or senators who voted for removal.
Although in Clinton's case journalists were not driving the story but
following official events, journalists and other pundits did engage in
extended and intense discussion of the relevancy question, and that
discussion seemed, like the official discussion of prosecutors and
members of Congress, to be centered on issues other than sex,
infidelity, and sexual character flaws alone.
Returning to Robert Nagel's insights, the Clinton episode may
then be a sign that at least a modest cultural corrective is under-
way. If this is so-and we are in the midst of at least a small
retrenchment of the values of genuine privacy, as opposed to the
pseudo-intimacy that characterizes modern celebrity-one interest-
ing question is whether this cultural movement will push any
parallel retrenchment of legal doctrine. Libel and privacy law may
both be battlegrounds on which this issue is played out, and it is
here that the questions posed by Robert Nagel's article intersect in
fascinating ways with the work of Diane Zimmerman, Robert O'Neil,
and Erwin Chemerinsky.
23. For a discussion of the Hart case and the relevancy issues applicable to it, see RODNEY
A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELLV. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 237-41 (Univ.
of Ill. Press 1990) (1988).
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III. SEX, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPE
If the real gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is what is
revealed, then the touchstone for designing legal rules will be
newsworthiness and the relevancy problem (the issues discussed in
Part II, above). But if the gravamen is not what is revealed but how
the revelation was obtained, then the touchstone is not substantive
relevancy so much as the perceived offensiveness of the
newsgathering process.
Diane Zimmerman very persuasively isolates the act of surrepti-
tiously recording the conversations or behavior of another as one of
the principal triggers for liability in current privacy suits predicated
on surreptitious newsgathering techniques.2 What she focuses on
is the intriguing fact that it is often not simply the perceived
intrusiveness into a zone of seclusion that seems to drive a privacy
suit so much as the fixation of the information gathered in a
tangible video or audio recording." It is this fixation element that
is prominent in so many recent cases arising from allegedly tortious
intrusions into situations that are not traditionally regarded as
"intimate" or entirely "private," such as business settings in which
the reporter is talking about matters in a workplace with other
employees nearby."
24. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 1208.
25. See id.
26. In Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (1999), the Supreme Court of
California dealt with the question of whether there could be an actionable intrusion for
electronic surveillance inside a business premises. See id. at 69. Areporterfor the defendant
('ABC") obtained employment at the Psychic Marketing Group ("PMG") as a telepsychic in
order to do an undercover investigation of the telepsychic industry. See id. at 70. The
telepsychics at PMG worked in five-foot high, three sided cubicles that were set up in one
large work area. See id. at 69. The facility consisted of the large work area, offices for the
managerial staff, and a separate lunchroom. See id. PMG did not allow nonemployees into
the office without specific permission. See id.
Once ABC's reporter was hired as a telepsychic, she sat at a cubicle like the other
employees and gave readings over the phone to customers. See id. at 70. The reporter
testified that she was easily able to overhear other employees' conversations from her work
station, and when not on the phone, she talked to some of the psychics. See id. The reporter's
conversations with the psychics were secretly videotaped and recorded. See id. Two of the
conversations recorded were with Mark Sanders, the plaintiff. See id. The first of the two
conversations was held outside the reporter's cubicle and included a third employee. See id.
This conversation was conducted in moderate tones, and Sanders conceded that the psychic
at the neighboring cubicle may have overheard the conversation if he were eavesdropping.
See id. The second conversation was held at Sanders's cubicle. See id. It was longer, more
in depth, and included only Sanders and the reporter. See id.
Sanders filed suit against the reporter andABC for two causes of action based on the
videotaping, one claiming a violation of section 632 of the California Penal Code and the
second alleging the common-law tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion. See id. At trial, the
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jury decided that the conversation between Sanders and the reporter was conducted "in
circumstances in which the parties to the communication may reasonably have expected that
the communications may have been overheard," andjudgment was entered for the defendants
on the section 632 cause of action. Id. Sanders prevailed, however, on the invasion of privacy
by intrusion cause of action, and the jury subsequently entered a substantial damages award
in his favor. See id. at 70-71. The court of appeals reversed the decision entered for the
plaintiff reasoning that the privacy tort requires that the invasion must occur in a secluded
area where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 71. The court found that
the jury's findingfor the defendant on the section 632 cause of action barred the plaintiff from
recovering for invasion of privacy. See id.
The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Sanders might well have had
reasonable expectations of privacy violated by ABC's actions. See id. at 77. 'There are
degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy," the court stated,
and "the fact the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not
render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law." Id. at 72. The court noted that even
though the intrusion tort is often defined in terms of "seclusion," absolute seclusion is not
required. See id. Quoting scholar J. Thomas McCarthy, the court observed that '[1]ike
"privacy," the concept of "seclusion" is relative. The mere fact that a person can be seen by
someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to
being seen by everyone.'" Id. (quoting MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
5.10[A][2], at 5-120.1 (West Group 1998)).
The court noted that the reporter, in contrast to bona fide employees, was only
employed at PMG long enough to meet, talk to, and videotape PMG's employees. See id. at
76. While she may have acted as a PMG employee when she took phone calls, the reporter
was acting as an agent of ABC, not PMG, during her recorded conversations with the other
psychics. See id. The court distinguished this situation from the decisions in Commonwealth
v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251 (1998) and Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345
(7th Cir. 1995). Alexander and Desnick involved investigations, by the Philadelphia police and
ABC, respectively, into the alleged misconduct of doctors. See Sanders, 978 P.2d at 76. The
court recognized that the cases were similar to Sanders's plight because the doctors were
either videotaped or recorded without their consent. See id. at 76-77. However, they differed
because the only conversations recorded were those between the doctor and the person
making the recording, the offices were open to anyone seeking treatment, and the content of
the recordings were restricted to solely professional communications. See id.
The court in Sanders thus concluded that "in the workplace, as elsewhere, the
reasonableness of a person's expectation of visual and aural privacy depends not only on who
might have been able to observe the subject interaction, but on the identity of the claimed
intruder and the means of intrusion." Id. at 77. Thus "a person who lacks a reasonable
expectation of complete privacy in a conversation, because it could be seen and overheard by
coworkers (but not the general public), may nevertheless have a claim for invasion of privacy
by intrusion based on a television reporter's covert videotaping of that conversation." Id. The
court rejected the claim that "the adoption of a doctrine of per se workplace privacy would
place a dangerous chill on the press' investigation of abusive activities in open work areas,
implicating substantial First Amendment concerns," disclaiming any intention to adopt any
"such per se doctrine." Id. The court stated that it was merely holding that
the possibility of being overheard by coworkers does not, as a matter of law,
render unreasonable an employee's expectation that his or her interactions
within a nonpublic workplace will not be videotaped in secret by a journalist.
In other circumstances, where, for example, the workplace is regularly open to
entry to observation by the public or press, or the interaction that was the
subject of the alleged intrusion was between proprietor (or employee) and
customer, any expectation of privacy against press recording is less likely to be
deemed reasonable. Nothing we say here prevents a media defendant from
attempting to show, in order to negate the offensiveness element of the
intrusion tort, that the claimed intrusion, even if it infringed on a reasonable
1242
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What is the difference between listening to a conversation and
recording it? Diane Zimmerman raises the ingenious argument
that, to the extent that lower court decisions often seem to focus on
the recording itself as the key element in the privacy invasion, this
focus appears to discriminate against newsgathering" Her
exploration of the cultural and psychological reasons that we place
greater emphasis on recorded images, particularly visual images,
than on mere word-of-mouth repetition of a person's statement, is
illuminating, insightful, and rings true.
I find myself stuck, however, on a far more cynical and pragmatic
plane. The main reason we may often be more offended by someone
who deceives and betrays us by surreptitiously recording our face-to-
face conversation than by someone who deceives and betrays us by
merely repeating our face-to-face conversation is that the recorder
has "got the goods" on us in a way the repeater has not. We can lie
and deny the repeater's story. It's your word against mine, he-said-
she-said, plausible deniability land.
But when there's a recording, you're nailed. Without the Water-
gate tapes, Richard Nixon would have finished out his presidential
term. Without the Linda Tripp tapes, the Monica Lewinsky story
would have been a nonstarter. Without the Food Lion tapes, no
story would have been run on ABC, no Food Lion stock would have
dropped, no lawsuit would have been filed.
I believe it probably gets even deeper. If I am talking to a person
who is wearing a hidden recording device, I am being deceived. Yet,
I am also being deceived if the person I am talking to is planning to
later repeat what I say for the purpose of getting me in trouble. On
one level, it can be argued that once I decide to talk to the person,
I'm surrendering any claim to privacy. After all, I am talking to the
person, and I know there is always the risk that this person may tell
others. The first rule of keeping a secret is that everybody talks.
So, if an ABC News reporter is disguised as a meatpacker and gets
a Food Lion employee to talk to him about poor sanitation practices
at Food Lion for the purpose of disseminating that information to
the public, the ABC reporter is engaged in deception, whether or not
expectation of privacy, was 'Justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the
news."
Id. (quoting Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)).
27. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 1208-10, 1212-15.
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the reporter is wired with recording devices. 28 Under this logic, the
Food Lion employee has assumed the risk of possible deception and
betrayal by choosing to talk at all. For all the gabbing Food Lion
employee knows, the other person may be a reporter in disguise, or
even a bona-fide employee who, overcome with disgust by what he
or she has learned, will blow the whistle, reporting Food Lion to
health officials, or running to the press. The risk that the employee
may also be wired is a "lesser included risk" of talking at all.29
But is this really the case? Or is there something about the
addition of the recording device that multiplies the deception and
betrayal? I think there is a multiplier-indeed, an exponential one.
Most of us do not behave the same way when talking into a
recording device as we do when talking under the assumption that
we are not being recorded, particularly when there is only one
person in the room. The difference in behavior is rooted in one raw
and basic fact: the recording will make it hard for us to later lie and
cover-up. We talk more freely when we think we are talking to only
one person, or to a small group of people because we believe that in
such conversations the potential damage if our statements are ever
revealed is relatively limited. If the conversation is recorded,
however, we can run, but we can't hide.
Deception in the surreptitious recording cases now is shown to cut
both ways. Yes, the wired journalist is engaged in deception in
getting the story. But the object of the story who is complaining
about the recording is also arguing, in a curious way, for a right to
deceive. For if the real harm here is that the person who was
recorded knows that he or she never would have said those things if
28. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1999);
see also Randall Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between an
Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMoRY L.J. 895 (1998).
29. In Food Lion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part a lower court decision arising from ABC's use of undercover
investigative reporters who tookjobs as Food Lion employees for the purpose ofobtainingfilm
footage from hidden cameras documenting alleged health abuses by Food Lion stores in the
preparation of food. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 524. The court of appeals found that there
was no First Amendment privilege sheltering the defendants from torts of "general
applicability." See id. at 520. The court held that because employment in North Carolina and
South Carolina was "at will," there was no fraud by the ABC employees in taking a job that
they only intended to occupy temporarily, while they were gathering information on the story.
See id. at 513. The court also held, however, that the ABC employees were guilty of trespass
and breach of loyalty to the employer because the consent that Food Lion gave to the ABC
employees to enter its work areas did not include a consent to surreptitiously videotape
events. See id. at 518. The ABC employees were not exercising loyalty to their nominal
employer, Food Lion, but to ABC. See id. Because the award of damages against the
defendants on those counts was only an award of two dollars in nominal damages, see id. at
524, the net financial effect of the ruling was a victory for ABC.
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they had known a recorder was on, the real reason they never would
have said those things is that they would have realized that since
they were being recorded, they could not lie and deny the statement
later on.
If this rationale is accurate, then the question becomes one of why
it might be that we are, in some circumstances, so concerned about
the invasion of privacy that we are willing to condemn it legally
even though it seems primarily to serve the plaintiffs seemingly
undeserving interest in preserving the right to deny what he said.
Perhaps the answer lies in having some sympathy for the deception,
or a willingness to excuse or even empower the deception in some
circumstances because of a judgment that there are overriding
interests in maintaining the inviolate integrity of certain settings.
Are courts, in effect, sometimes saying: "Yes, the reason you wanted
this to not be recorded is that you wanted to be capable of denying
or hiding your statements or your behavior. What you were about
was deception. Your motives may not have been entirely admirable,
but you were entitled."?
The question then becomes whether this entitlement is truly one
the law ought to bestow. The case for protecting privacy in this
situation is, in my view, highly ambivalent. Traditionally our social
intuitions and legal doctrines protecting privacy have tended to
emphasize much weightier values.
We often protect conversations, for example, in which we have
reached the social judgment that the interest in permitting the
parties to discuss the issues at hand with entire candor is so strong
that we wish to arm those parties with a privilege (absolute or
qualified) against forced revelation. We protect attorney-client
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conversations ° and conversations in the White House,3' to facilitate
candor in the service of larger social interests.
So too, we protect privacy in certain settings because of the unique
intimacy those settings pose. As we are socially habituated to
treating such matters as sexuality, love, physical health, or medical
procedures as uniquely private, our legal doctrines are predictably
more likely to treat such activities as within the ambit of protected
privacy. This is as true in tort as it is in constitutional doctrine."
Finally, through such devices as trade secret law, proprietary
interests in information may receive a commercial variant of
"privacy" protection to vindicate legitimate property and entrepre-
neurial interests highly valued by society.3
In the typical privacy suit of the sort Diane Zimmerman has
identified, however, plaintiffs cannot credibly claim that any of
these interests are being vindicated. ABC's surreptitious recording
of Food Lion employees allegedly demonstrating unhealthy food
preparation practices did not implicate any settings justifying
enhanced solicitude for candor, any aspects of human intimacy, or
any legitimate proprietary business secrets.
It is thus important, I believe, to distinguish the kind of commer-
cial privacy case posed by Food Lion and privacy suits involving
private figures who have at least a colorable claim to a genuine
30. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998) ("The [attorney-
client] privilege is intended to encourage 'full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
the administration of justice. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399
(1981))).
31. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). In discussing presidential
communications, the Court found that:
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communi-
cations. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Id.
32. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 1122-26; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (affirming "core" of abortion rights recognized in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but modifying that right through imposition of "undue burden"
standard).
33. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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"intimacy" invasion. In Shulman v. Group WProductions, Inc., 4 for
example, the Supreme Court of California sustained an invasion of
privacy action arising from news coverage of accident victims'
medical treatment by a rescue helicopter squad." The court held
that the story of rescue was of legitimate public interest, as was the
victims' appearance and words, and that the cameraman's presence
and filming of events at the accident scene was not an intrusion on
the victims' seclusion. 6 The court also held, however, that the
victims may have had reasonable expectations of privacy once they
were placed in a rescue helicopter, and that they were also entitled
to a degree of privacy in conversations with medical rescuers." The
recording of communications between the victims and the medical
rescuers, as well as the filming of one of the victims in the helicopter
ambulance, may have been highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and thus actionable.3"
Setting aside cases implicating confidentiality settings, intimacy,
or proprietary interests, the question then again becomes why
should Food Lion have any remedy for the actions taken by ABC?
The answer usually proffered is that ABC was guilty of deceptions
that would be tortious if performed by a nonjournalist, and thus
must also be tortious if performed by a journalist. Citing the
shibboleth that journalists enjoy no exemption from criminal or civil
laws of general applicability,39 the argument is simply made that
tort doctrines such as trespass, fraud, or intrusion protect even
commercial enterprises from entry under false pretenses. Since
undercover journalism will, by definition, involve various shades of
deception, the law of torts has free reign to punish that deception,
and the First Amendment simply ought not be part of the conversa-
tion.
34. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
35. See id. at 488-89.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 490-91.
38. The court adopted the definition ofthe intrusion tart articulated in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (1977), and held that the cause of action has two elements: (1)
intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person. See id. at 490. The first element, the court held, is not met when the
plaintiffhas merely been observed, or even photographed or recorded, in a public place. See
id. Rather, "the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or
sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The
tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or
solitude in the place, conversation or data source." Id.
39. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547,567 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,850 (1974); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974).
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As Erwin Chemerinsky and Diane Zimmerman both point out,
however, undercover investigative reporting is often the only way to
get at the truth about stories of profound public interest." Erwin
Chemerinsky, in turn, quite persuasively observes that First
Amendment doctrine often treats even the content-neutral regula-
tion of speech as deserving of significant levels of protection through
some variant of "intermediate scrutiny" review.4  Under the
familiar intermediate scrutiny standard of United States v.
O'Brien,42 for example, a governmental regulation is adequately
justified despite its incidental impact upon First Amendment
interests, if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; ifthe governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
That newsgathering torts do not directly predicate liability on
content, in short, is no reason why substantial levels of First Amend-
ment protection ought nevertheless apply to the application of such
torts.4
The question then becomes how one would translate the doctrinal
notion of "intermediate scrutiny" into tort doctrine so as to create a
"surreptitious newsgathering privilege" that could be interposed by
defendants in situations such as the Food Lion case.
Without attempting to fully develop the contours of such a
pr ivilege, I venture the following rough outline. First, one would
carefully cross-examine the plaintiffs claim of tortious invasion of
privacy to determine if anything that might plausibly be treated as
a "substantial" interest is at stake. The preservation of candor and
confidentiality in settings calling for such protection (settings
analogous to the attorney-client privilege paradigm) would certainly
qualify. So would settings invoking genuine claims of intimacy or
bona fide proprietary interests, such as the preservation of trade
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1144-45; Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 1189-91,
1206-07, 1227.
41. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1162.
42. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
43. Id. at 377.
44. See Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 46,57- 58 (1987)
("[T]he Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of
communication, content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability ofindividuals
to communicate their views to others.").
1248
NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE
secrets. When no such interests are implicated, however, the social
interest in vindicating the plaintiffs privacy claim strikes me as
relatively anemic.
Once one has seen the ABC broadcast that triggered the Food
Lion suit, it may be difficult to conjure enormous sympathy for Food
Lion, but it may still be possible to engender a deep sense of outrage
over ABC's investigative methods. What may well be driving
successful plaintiffs' outcomes in these situations is not so much
sympathy for the plaintiff as outrage at the perceived misconduct of
journalists, who are often caricatured as arrogant and driven
entirely by the glory that comes from a juicy scoop or sting, and the
profits that come from highly-rated programming featuring
investigative reports that are not particularly expensive to produce.
The journalists are seen as presumptuously claiming a right to take
the law into their own hands, thumbing their noses at civil and
criminal limitations that apply to everyone else. Ifthese sentiments
are, in fact, supplying the real push behind such plaintiffs' victories,
it may expose such suits as not predicated on neutral laws of
general applicability at all, but rather on laws that, at least as
applied, target the press and the newsgathering process for
especially disfavorable treatment.
Yet I doubt that we can, or should, entirely discount the social
importance of these anti-media perceptions. If we were to design a
test for tortious undercover newsgathering that looked only at the
interests of the plaintiff, we would be failing to give any credence
whatsoever to the obviously widespread concern among members of
the public and among judges crafting legal doctrines that the press
is appropriately claiming to be subject to a law unto itself.
Thus a balancing test might be created that would look at the
relative strength of the plaintiffs interest in relation to the conduct
of the media. In examining the media's conduct, however, it makes
no sense to concentrate on either such physically technical matters
as whether the entry was or was not a trespass, or on whether the
deception was in some sense magnified by tape-recording. Rather,
in much the same way that we examine the legitimacy of undercover
surveillance efforts by police, I suggest that we focus more on the
motive that underlies the media's surreptitious newsgathering."
45. See Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(determining offensiveness requires consideration of all the circumstances of the intrusion,
including its degree and setting and the intruder's "motives and objectives").
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Journalists sometimes speak of "journalistic probable cause" in
discussing whether going undercover to get a story is justified.
Journalists also sometimes articulate the notion that such tactics
are justified only in the pursuit of stories of a high level of public
importance. In assessing the perceived "offensiveness" of an
allegedly tortious intrusion, an examination by the judge and jury
into why the journalist believed that wrongdoing was being
committed-an inquiry, if you will, into "probable cause"-is appropri-
ate.46 This inquiry, I believe, will often favor the press because the
journalist will be able to present objectively reasonable grounds for
believing that the institution being investigated was guilty of
serious wrongdoing, and for explaining why undercover techniques,
including hidden recording devices, were the only viable methods of
ferreting out that wrongdoing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Taking these issues full circle, it is worth reflecting on the
dynamic between causes of action grounded in libel law and causes
of action grounded in some variant of invasion of privacy. In
discussing Robert Nagel's exploration of the role of celebrity, I noted
the odd parallel between libel law's all-purpose public figure
construct and the mega-celebrity phenomenon, with its chintzy
celebration of pseudo-intimacy.47 The relevancy question in libel
law, of course, has its parallel in privacy doctrine. When the cause
of action is for publication of private facts, tort doctrine and First
Amendment principles trump the privacy claim when the private
material is deemed "newsworthy."' The pressure in privacy law on
46. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) ("Information
collecting techniques that may be highly offensive when done for socially unprotected
reasons-for purposes of harassment, blackmail or prurient curiosity, for example-may not
be offensive to a reasonable person when employed by journalists in pursuit of a socially or
politically important story.").
47. See discussion supra Part II.
48. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981);
Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Ct.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 540 P.2d 248 (N.M. 1975); Freihoffer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985);
Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co., Inc., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986).
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what is or is not "newsworthy" is the same pressure that exists on
the libel side when we ask questions of relevancy.49
When the tort is a newsgathering tort, however, the newsworthi-
ness concept is often ignored because of the reflex judgment that the
tort is not about the content of what was published or broadcast, but
about the method of obtaining that content. My suggestion, as
amplified in the discussion above, is that this is nearsighted. To the
extent that the sound application of newsgathering torts in the
context of the constitutionally protected interest in gathering news
requires a balance of the interests of the plaintiff against the
behavior of the press, the news value of the story, and the necessity
of resorting to undercover techniques to obtain it, must be relevant.
In such cases, it must be remembered that the plaintiff cannot
launch a successful libel suit because the information revealed will,
by hypothesis, be true.5" At least in cases in which the plaintiff has
been caught in serious wrongdoing and no palpable interests in
protecting confidential communications, intimacy, or proprietary
information are advanced, the journalist who has pursued a story of
high public interest on the basis of genuine probable cause deserves
a privilege against liability.
49. See generally Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 1007 (1989) (observing that the newsworthi-
ness test "bears an enormous social pressure, and itis not surprising to find that the common
law is deeply confused and ambivalent about its application").
50. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1272-74 (Nev. 1995).
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